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Abstract—In this paper, recent results in game theory and
stochastic approximation are brought together to mitigate the
problem of femto-to-macrocell cross-tier interference. The main
result of this paper is an algorithm which reduces the impact
of interference of femtocells over the existing macrocells. Such
algorithm relies on the observations of the signal to interfer-
ence plus noise ratio (SINR) of all active communications in
both macro and femtocells when they are fed back to the
corresponding base stations. Based on such observations, femto
base stations learn the probability distributions over the feasible
transmit configurations (frequency band and power levels) such
that a minimum time-average SINR can be guaranteed in the
macrocells, at the equilibrium. In this paper, we introduce the
concept of logit equilibrium (LE) and present its interpretation
in terms of the trade-off faced by femtocells when experimenting
several actions to discover the network, and taking the action
to maximize their instantaneous performance. Finally, numerical
results are given to validate our theoretical findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a new type of indoor Base Station (BS), called
femtocell, has gained the attention of the industry [1] due to
the enormous benefits it brings to both end-users and network
operators. For instance, end-users can enjoy better signal
qualities due to the reduced distance between the transmitter
and the receiver, resulting in higher throughputs, power and
battery savings. From the operator’s point of view, femtocells
will extend the indoor coverage, enhance system capacity, and
share the spectrum in a more efficient manner [2]. However,
these benefits are not easy to accomplish, and there are
challenges that mobile operators must address before success-
fully deploying femtocell networks. Among these challenges,
there is the cross-tier interference between macrocells and
femtocells which highly impact the quality-of-service (QoS)
of the already existing networks. Therefore, distributed and
efficient self-organization strategies need to be designed in
order to make the deployment of femtocell networks feasible.
Many results exist along this direction, e.g., see [3], [5] among
others. In [3] and [5], a Q-learning based algorithm was
investigated in the context of network selection for hetero-
geneous wireless networks, and channel selection in multi-
user cognitive radios, respectively. In [6], a reinforcement-
learning framework based on Q-learning was studied for inter-
ference mitigation among femtocells. Nevertheless, the above-
mentioned works often require information exchange among
transmitters, which represents a non-affordable increment of
signaling messages.
In this paper, we propose a fully decentralized method for
interference minimization/mitigation from the femtocell BS
(FBS) to the macrocell user equipments (MUEs), i.e., our
interest focuses in the downlink interaction between femto-
and macrocell systems, as shown in Fig. 1. The underlying
assumption over which our work relies on is that, the feedback
Fig. 1. Network topology with one macrocell underlaid with three femtocell
networks. MUE and FUE stand for macro/femtocell user equipment, respec-
tively. MBS and FBS stand for macro and femtocell base station, respectively.
messages from MUEs to their corresponding macrocell BS
containing their instantaneous signal to interference plus noise
ratio (SINR) can be decoded by all FBSs. The repetitive
observation of the SINR is used by the FBS to dynamically
configure how often different frequency bands are used such
that, a minimum time-average SINR level can be guaranteed to
the MUEs. Our proposal combines recent results in game the-
ory, learning theory, and stochastic approximation to address
such an issue.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system
and game model are presented. Section III describes how FBSs
can build a reliable image of the average state of the network
based on noisy observations of the SINR of the active user
terminals in the downlink. Section IV describes a learning
algorithm for interference mitigation, which is the main result
of this paper. Numerical results are presented in Section V.
Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. MODELS
A. Notations
Boldface lower case and lower case symbols represent
vectors and scalars. Given a random variable z, the expectation
with respect to z is denoted by Ez [.]. The indicator function is
denoted by 1{condition} and it equals 1 (resp. 0) when condi-
tion is true (resp. false). Given a finite set A, △(A) represents
the set of all probability distributions over the elements of
the finite set A. Let the vector e(S)s =

e
(S)
s,1 , ..., e
(S)
s,S

∈ RS
denote the s-th vector of the canonical base spanning the space
of real vectors of dimension S. Here, ∀n ∈ {1, ..., S} \ {s},
e
(S)
s,n = 0 and e(S)s,s = 1.
B. System Model
Consider a set of M = {1, . . . ,M} macrocell base stations
(MBS) each one operating over an exclusive fixed frequency
band and serving their respective macrocell user equipments
(MUEs) using a time division multiple access (TDMA) policy.
At each time interval, each MBS serves one of its correspond-
ing MUE aiming to guaranteing a minimum time-average
SINR over their communication duration. We assume that
there exists a set S = {1, . . . , S} of S frequency bands
over which MBS can operate. Let Γ(m)0 , m ∈ M, denote
the minimum time-average SINR offered by MBS m over
its corresponding fixed frequency band. Consider now a set
K = {1, . . . ,K} of K femtocells underlaying the M -cell S-
frequency band macrocell system. Each femtocell can use any
of the available frequency bands to serve its corresponding
femto end-users (FUE) as long as it does not induce a lower
time-average SINR than the minimum required by the MUE,
i.e., Γ(1)0 , . . . ,Γ
(M)
0 . At each time interval each FBS serves one
FUE over one of the available channels following a TDMA
policy.
Let t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞} be a discrete time index. For all
(j, k,m) ∈ M2 × S, h
(s)
1,j,k represents the channel realization
between MBS k and MUE j over channel m at time t. For
all (j, k,m) ∈ K × M × S, h(s)2,j,k represents the channel
realization between MBS k and FUE j over channel s at time
t. For all (j, k,m) ∈M×K×S, h(s)3,j,k represents the channel
realization between FBS k and MUE j over channel s at time
t. Finally, for all (j, k,m) ∈ K2 × S, h(s)4,j,k represents the
channel realization between FBS k and FUE j over channel s
at time t. Denote by h(t) the vector of all channel realizations
at time t. All channel realizations, i.e., each component of
h(t), are independent and identically distributed following a
probability distribution which is a parameter of the network.
Let the finite set denoted byH be the set of all possible vectors
h(t), for all t > 0. Finally, channel realizations at time t are
independent of those at time t− 1, for all t > 0.
Let pk,max and p0,m, with k ∈ K and m ∈ M, be the
maximum transmit power of FBS k and MBS m, respectively.
For all k ∈ K, let the S-dimensional vector pk(t) =

p
(1)
k (t), ..., p
(S)
k (t)

denote the power allocation vector of
FBS k ∈ K at time t. Here p(s)k (t) is the transmit power
of femtocell k over frequency band s at time t. All FBS
are assumed to transmit only over one frequency band at
each time t at a given power level not exceeding pk,max. Let
Lk ∈ N be the number of discrete power levels of FBS k, i.e.,
pk,max
Lk
, . . . , pk,max. For all (k, ℓ, s) ∈ K × {1, . . . , LK} × S,
denote by the S-dimensional vector
q
(ℓ,s)
k =
ℓ
L
pk,maxe
(S)
s , (1)
the power allocation (PA) vector when FBS transmits over
channel s at power level ℓ. Denote also by q(0,0)k , with k ∈
K, the S-dimensional null vector, i.e., q(0,0) = (0, . . . , 0) ∈
R
(S)
. Thus, FBS k has Nk = Lk · S + 1 possible PA vectors,
q(0,0), q
(1,1)
k , . . . , q
(Lk,S)
k .
For all (k, s) ∈ K × S , let γ(s)k be the SINR of FUE k at time
t and for all m ∈ M, let γ(sm)0,m be the SINR of the MUE in
the macrocell m at time t. Let also the set Ms ⊂ M, with
s ∈ S, be the set of MBS using channel s. Then, we can write
that
γ
(s)
k
(t)=
p
(s)
k
(t)

h
(s)
4,k,k
(t)


2
σ
(s)2
k
+
X
m∈Ms
p0,m

h
(s)
2,k,m
(t)


2
+
X
j∈K\{k}
p
(s)
j
(t)

h
(s)
4,k,j
(t)


2
(2)
and for all m ∈M,
γ
(sm)
0,m (t)=
p0,m

h
(sm)
1,m,m(t)


2
σ
(sm)
2
0,m
+
X
j∈Msm\{m}
p0,j|h(sm)1,m,j (t)|
2
+
X
i∈K\{k}
pi,max|h(sm)3,m,i(t)|
2
,
(3)
where for all m ∈M, sm is the channel used by MBS m and
σ
(sm)
0,m
2
and σ(sm)k
2
is the noise power over MUE m and the
noise power over FUE k on the frequency band s.
All FBSs are interested in optimizing a given interference
minimization/mitigation metric denoted by φ : RS·K+M → R,
which determines at each instant t the impact of the interfer-
ence on the macro system based on the observation of all the
SINR levels γ(s)k and γ
(sm)
0,m , with (k, s) ∈ K×S and m ∈M.
Later, we provide explicit expressions for φ depending on the
interest of all FBSs.
C. Game Theoretic Model
The interference minimization problem described in the
previous section can be modeled by a stochastic game made
of a sequence of strategic games played at different states,
e.g., channel realizations. Let us denote by G(h(t)) =
(K, {Ak}k∈K, {φ}k∈K) the static strategic game and let us
denote by G = {G(h(t))}t>0 the stochastic game where at
each time t, the game G(h(t)) is played, with t ∈ {1, . . . ,∞}.
We describe in detail both formulations.
1) Short Term Formulation: Let us describe the network
during the interval from t − 1 to t by the game G(h(t)) =
(K, {Ak}k∈K, {φ}). Here, K represents the set of FBS in the
network. For all k ∈ K, the set of actions of FBS k is the
set of power allocation vectors, i.e., Ak = {q(ℓ,s)k : ℓ ∈
{0, . . . , Lk}, and s ∈ S}. Finally, φ : H× A1 × AK → R+
is the payoff or interference minimization metric of all fem-
tocells.
At each time t > 0 and for all k ∈ K, FBS k chooses
its action from the finite set Ak following a probability dis-
tribution pik(t) =

π
k,q
(0,0)
k
(t), π
k,q
(1,1)
k
(t), ..., π
k,q
(Lk,Sk)
k
(t)

where π
k,q
(lk,sk)
k
is the probability that femtocell k plays action
q
(lk,sk)
k at time t, i.e.,
π
k,q
(lk,sk)
k
= Pr

pk(t) = q
(lk,sk)
k

. (4)
where (lk, sk) ∈ {1, ..., LK} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}. In the follow-
ing, we describe the long-term game G, and we introduce
the method which each FBS uses to choose the probability
distribution pik(t), at each time t.
2) Long-Term Formulation: The long-term behavior of
the network is modeled by the succession of static strate-
gic games G = {G (h(t))}t>0. This succession produces
a Markov game G = {G(h(t))}t>0, where at each stage
t the game G(h(t)) is played assuming that the network
is described by the vector h(t). According to the system
model, the actual state of the network h(t) follows a Markov
chain with transitions following the rule, ∀
 
h′,h′′

∈ H2,
Pr

h(t) = h′

h(t− 1) = h′′

= Pr
 
h(t) = h′

= πh′ .
Here, πh′ , for all h′ ∈ H, are parameters obtained from
previous channel modeling studies. Note that transitions be-
tween states are independent of the actions of the transmitters.
This assumption might appear restrictive, however, it perfectly
models the time-varying nature of wireless channels, which are
independent of the transmit configurations of radio devices.
The game G = {G(h(t))}t>0 proceeds in infinitely many
stages. At each stage t ∈ {0, . . . ,∞}, FBSs choose their
corresponding actions p1(t), . . . ,pK(t). When doing so,
each FBS k observes a noisy sample φ˜k(t) of the cor-
responding instantaneous interference minimization metric
φ(h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)), i.e.,
φ˜k(t) = φ(h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)) + εk,pk(t)(t), (5)
where, ∀(ℓk, sk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}, and ∀k ∈ K,
ε
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) is the realization at time t of a random variable
ε
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
which represents the additive noise on the observa-
tion of the instantaneous performance φ(t) when FBS k plays
action q(ℓk,sk)k . Here, we assume that E
h
ε
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
i
= 0.
Our behavioral assumption is that all FBS are interested
on choosing the probability distribution pik(t) ∈ △ (Ak) to
optimize the time-average interference minimization metric at
each time t > 0, i.e., φ¯k(t), which is calculated empirically
based on the observations φ˜k(t) as follows,
φ¯k(t) =
1
t
t
X
n=1
eφk(n). (6)
To choose the optimal probability distribution pik(t), the
FBS relies on estimations of the time-average interference
minimization metric obtained with each of its actions. For
all (ℓk, sk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}, let φˆk,q(ℓk,sk)
k
(t),
be the estimation of time-average interference minimization
metric obtained by playing action q(ℓk,sk)k . This estimation is
calculated as follows,
φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) = 1
T
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t)
t
X
n=1
φ˜k(n)1
pk(n)=q
(ℓk,sk)
k
©,(7)
where, T
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) =
t
X
n=1
1
pk(n)=q
(ℓk,sk)
k
©
. Once the Nk-
dimensional vector of estimations of FBS k is obtained, i.e.,
φˆk =

φˆ
k,q
(0,0)
k
, φˆ
k,q
(1,1)
k
, . . . , φˆ
k,q
(Lk,S)
k

for all k ∈ K,
it is used to determine the optimal probability distribution
pik(t) =

π
k,q
(0,0)
k
, π
k,q
(1,1)
k
, . . . , π
k,q
(Lk,S)
k

at each time t.
For doing so, we define the function βk : RNk →△ (A). Note
that the probability distribution βk

φˆk(t)

must take into
consideration that, FBSs must experiment between different
actions such that the estimation vector φˆk(t) is improved at
each time t, but also FBSs must optimize their respective
interference minimization metric. In the following, we present
the existing trade-off between both goals which might appear
at a first glance as two antagonic processes.
III. EXPLORATION VS. PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION
As shown in Sec II-C, all FBSs face a trade-off between
optimizing their time-average utility by taking the action that
does it at each time t, and trying out different actions so
as to improve the estimation of the time-average interference
mitigation metric obtained with each action. This implies that
a reasonable behavioral rule would be to choose the actions
which yield high payoffs more likely than actions yielding low
payoffs, but in any case, always letting a non-null probability
of playing any of the actions. Following the results in [8], [9],
the behavioral rule described above can be modeled by the
probability distribution βk(φˆk(t)) satisfying,
βk(φˆk(t)) ∈ arg max
pik∈△(Ak)
h
X
pk∈Ak
πk,pk φˆk,pk(t) + κkH(pik)
i
(8)
where H represents the Shannon entropy function. In general,
given a probability measure π1, ..., πN over an set of N
elements, it follows that
H(π1, ..., πN ) = −
N
X
n=1
πn ln(πn). (9)
For all k ∈ K, the parameter κk > 0 represents the interest of
FBS k to choose other actions rather than the optimal one in
order to improve the time-average interference minimization
metric.
The unique solution to the right hand side of the optimization
problem in (8) is written as:
βk(φˆk(t))=

β
k,q
(0,0)
k
(φˆk(t)),β
k,q
(1,1)
k
(φˆk(t)),...,β
k,q
(Lk,S)
k
(φˆk(t))

,
(10)
where for all k ∈ K and for all (ℓk, sk) ∈ Lk × S ∪ {(0, 0)}
and k ∈ K:
β
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(φˆk(t)) =
exp

1
κk
φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t)

P
pk∈Ak
exp

1
κk
φˆk,pk(t)
 , (11)
where β
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(φˆk(t)) > 0, with strict inequality regardless
of the estimation vector φˆk(t), with t > 0. Equation (11) is
known in the game theoretic jargon as smooth best response
[7] and implies a different concept of equilibrium with respect
to the classical Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium, known
as logit equilibrium or Boltzmann-Gibbs equilibrium [12] is
defined as follows,
Definition 1: (Logit Equilibrium): Consider the Markov
game G = {G(h(t))}t>0. The mixed strategy profile pi∗ =
(pi∗1, ...,pi
∗
K) ∈ △ (A1) ,× . . . ,×△ (AK) is a logit equilib-
rium, if ∀k ∈ K,
pi∗k = βk

óφk
 
pi∗−k


, (12)
where the Nk dimensional vector óφk (pi−k) =

óφ
k,q
(0,0)
k
(pi−k) , óφk,q(1,1)
k
(pi−k) , . . . , óφk,q(Lk,S)
k
(pi−k)

is the expected interference minimization metric, i.e., for all
k ∈ K and for all (ℓk, sk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)}),
óφ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(pi−k)=Eh
2
4
X
p−k∈A−k

Y
j∈K\{k}
π∗j,pj

φ(h,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
,p−k)
3
5.
Note that Def. 1 implies a fixed point equation as in
the case of the classical Nash equilibrium [10], e.g., let
β : R
P
K
j=1
Nj → △ (A1)×, . . . × △ (AK) be defined as
follows,
β(pi) =

β1

óφ1 (pi−1)

, . . . ,βK

óφK (pi−K)

.
Thus, if pi∗ is a logit equilibrium then, pi∗ = β (pi∗).
It is also important to remark that when κk → 0, the
resulting probability distribution approaches the best response
(BR) correspondence. First, let us define the best response
correspondence as follows:
Definition 2: (Best Response Correspondence): Consider
the Markov game G = {G(h(t))}t>0. For all k ∈ K, the
best response correspondance in pure strategies BRk : H ×
Q
i∈K\{k}△ (Ai)→ Ak is defined as follows:
BRk(h(t),pi−k(t)) =
arg max
qk∈Ak
X
p−k∈A−k

φ(h(t),qk,p−k)
Y
j∈K\{k}
πj,pj (t)

. (13)
Now, we show how both smooth best response (11) and the
best-response (13) are related when the perturbation (entropy
term in (8)) vanishes.
Theorem 1: (Theorem 2 in [9]) Consider the Markov game
G = {G(h(t))}t>0. Then, for all k ∈ K and for all (ℓk, sk) ∈
Lk × S ∪ {(0, 0)}, it holds that:
lim
κk→0
β
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k

óφk (pi−k)

=
1
q
(ℓk,sk)
k
∈BRk(pi−k)
©
|BRk (pi−k)|
. (14)
The proof of Theorem 1 follows the same arguments that the
proof of Theorem 2 in [9]. Theorem 1 implies that as long
as the perturbation vanishes, the mixed strategies obtained by
using the smooth best-response approach a uniform probability
distribution over all the actions of the best response at a given
time t.
Conversely to the vanishing perturbation case, when κk →
∞, the resulting probability distribution approaches the uni-
form probability distribution over all the set of feasible
frequency-bands and power-levels sets. In the following sec-
tion, we introduce a novel technique for achieving LE for a
given set of constants κ1, . . . , κK .
IV. ACHIEVING THE LOGIT EQUILIBRIUM (LE)
In this section, we focus on the procedure used by FBSs
to achieve a logit equilibrium for a given constant set of
parameters κk, with k ∈ K. We present the main result of
this paper in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Achieving the LE): Consider the game
G = {G(h(t))}t>0. Assume that the estimation of the
time-average interference minimization metric and the mixed
strategy of FBS k are calculated as follows, ∀k ∈ K and
∀(ℓk, sk) ∈ {1, . . . , Lk} × S ∪ {(0, 0)},
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) = φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t−1)+
α(t)
1
pk(t)=q
(ℓk,sk)
k
©
π
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t)

φ˜(t)−φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t−1)

,
π
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) = π
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t−1)+
λ(t)

β
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(φˆk(t))−π
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t−1)

,
(15)
where, φˆk(0) ∈ RNk and pik(0) ∈ △ (Ak) are arbitrary
initializations and λ and α are learning rates chosen such
that
lim
T→∞
T
X
t=0
α(t) + λ(t) = +∞ (16)
lim
T→∞
T
X
t=0
α(t)2 + λ(t)2 < +∞, and, (17)
lim
t→∞
λ(t)
α(t)
= 0. (18)
Then, both learning processes in (15) converge for all k ∈ K,
and it holds that,
lim
t→∞
pik(t) = pi
∗
k, (19)
lim
t→∞
φˆ
k,q
(ℓk,sk)
k
(t) = óφk(pi
∗
−k), (20)
where pi∗ = (pi∗1, . . . ,pi∗K) is a LE of the game G =
{G(h(t))}t>0.
The proof of Prop. 1 follows the same steps of the proof of
Prop. 3 in [9] and can be described in three steps. First, the pro-
cesses φˆ1(t), . . . , φˆK(t) and the processes pi1(t), . . . ,piK(t)
can be written as two stochastic approximation (SA) algo-
rithms φˆ(t) and pi(t) by stacking them as a single vectors.
Second, both SA algorithms satisfy the standard conditions
to approximate them by two ordinary differential equations
(ODE) [11]. Finally, using (18), it can be assumed that the
process φˆ(t) sees the process pi(t) as almost time-invariant,
and the process pi(t) sees the process φˆ(t) as always calibrated
to the current value of the former. Applying this reasoning to
the asymptotic analysis of the ODEs leads to the proof of
Prop. 1.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Consider only one macrocell per frequency band and as-
sume S = 4 available frequency bands, i.e., M = S = 4. The
macrocell system is underlaid with K = 2 femtocells. We
assume that femtocells have L = 3 transmit power levels and
the average signal-to-noise ratio for the macro- and femtocells
are 20 dB and 10 dB per frequency band, respectively.
More precisely, ∀(k, s) ∈ K × S, SNR(s)
k
=
pk,max
σ2
k,s
=10dBs and
∀m ∈ M, SNR(sm)m =
p0,m
σ2
0,m
=20dBs. The minimum SINR of
the macrocells are given by Γ0 = (8, 9, 12, 13) dB. The
interference minimization/minimization metric adopted in this
numerical example is the following:
φ(h(t),pk(t),p−k(t)) =
PK
k=1
PS
s=1 γ
(s)
k (t).
QM
m=1 1

{γ
(sm)
0,m (t)>Γ
(sm)
0,m }
	. (21)
This metric at a given instant t is different from zero only
if all the MBSs satisfy at time t the minimum SINR level
required for their own communications. The non-zero value
represents the sum of the achieved SINR of all the FBS in the
system. Hence, as long as all MBSs see their QoS requirement
satisfied, FBSs obtain a positive reward. This models a certain
altruism from the behavior of the FBSs which sacrifice their
performance to guarantee the QoS of the macrocell system.
Many other interference minimization functions can be devised
to model the problem depending on particular features of the
network. However this is out of the scope of this paper.
In Figure 2, the evolution of the probability distribution over
the set of actions taken by both FBSs is shown. As time goes
by, FBS k = 1 increases the probability to transmit with the
maximum power level on frequency band s = 1, while the
probability of transmitting on other bands decreases. On the
other hand, the probability that FBS k = 2 transmits with
maximum transmit power level on carrier s = 2 increases with
time, whereas the probabilities of transmitting over the other
frequency bands decrease. It can also be seen that although
femtocells do not communicate with each other, they coordi-
nate their access to the spectrum by using different frequency
bands with very high probability. Note also that s = 1 and
s = 2 are the frequency bands where the corresponding MBS
demands the lowest SINR level. Figure 3 shows the evolution
of the corresponding ergodic transmission rate for both FBS.
Finally, the evolution of the ergodic transmission rate of the
macrocells is shown in Figure 4. Clearly, all requirements are
satisfied for the macrocell system.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the probability distribution over the set of actions of
femtocell 1 (left) and femtocell 2 (right).
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, the cross-tier interference mitigation was
studied in the framework of cognitive femtocells. Here, the
behavior of femtocells aiming to avoid interference over the
existing macrocells has been tackled using the fact that SINR
messages fed-back from the end user terminals to their corre-
sponding base stations can be decoded by all femtocells. Based
on those observations, the behavior of femtocells is modeled
by a smooth best response with respect to their expected
interference minimization metric. This behavioral rule has
been shown to lead the network to converge towards a logit
equilibrium, where FBSs perfectly balance their willingness
of experimenting several actions to discover the network, and
adopting the actions for performance optimization. In our
future work, we will investigate the possibility of improving
the convergence speed as well as studying other learning
mechanisms in the context of femtocell networks.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
x 105
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
Time Interval n
E
rg
o
d
ic
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
on
R
at
e
p
er
C
ar
ri
er
 
 
Femto k = 1 on s = 1
Femto k = 1 on s = 2
Femto k = 1 on s = 3
Femto k = 1 on s = 4
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
x 105
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
Time Interval n
E
rg
o
d
ic
T
ra
n
sm
is
si
on
R
at
e
p
er
C
ar
ri
er
 
 
Femto k = 2 on s = 1
Femto k = 2 on s = 2
Femto k = 2 on s = 3
Femto k = 2 on s = 4
Fig. 3. Evolution of the ergodic transmission rate of femtocell 1 (left) and
femtocel 2 (right).
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Fig. 4. Evolution of the ergodic transmission rate of the macrocell.
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